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I. PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING 
All parties to this proceeding are identified in the caption. Appellant Carol Capato 
was the plaintiff. Appellees Garff Enterprise, Inc., Ken Garff, Tena Holbrook, and 
Does I-X were the defendants. 
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IV. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
V. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 
Whether the trial court correctly determined that there was no genuine issue of 
material fact that plaintiff purchased the vehicle "As Is - No Warranty" and "Nothing 
Owed/Nothing Promised" and that, in any event, the Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale itself 
completely precludes all of Capato's causes of action. Minute Entry, R. 134-36; A. 7-9; 
Order and Judgment, R. 143-44; A. 11-12. 
Standard of Review 
The Appellate Court reviews the trial court's conclusion of law that the Motor 
Vehicle Contract of Sale itself, further supplemented by the "As Is - No Warranty" 
disclaimer, and the "Nothing Owed/Nothing Promised" disclaimer, precludes all of 
Capato's claims with no presumption of correctness. Smith v. United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty Co., 949 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997) (citing Zions First National Bank v. National 
American Title Ins., 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988)). 
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VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
On June 1, 1996, Carol Capato purchased from Tena Holbrook a used 1986 
Mercedes 190E that had 126,850 miles on it. R. 63-65, 97-98, and 102; A. 1-2, and 6. 
On July 3, 1996, Capato was traveling east on 1-80 towards Evanston, Wyoming in the 
1986 Mercedes. R. 92. The air bag deployed causing Capato to lose control of the car. 
Id. Capato allegedly suffered personal injuries and property damage in the accident. 
R. 1-8. 
The car was sold pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale that disclaimed all 
warranties. R. 63-64 and 97-98; A. 1-2. Capato admitted and the trial court acknowl-
edged that she signed this contract. R. 92. Further, the car was sold "As Is - No 
Warranty" and "Nothing Owed/Nothing Promised." R. 61 and 99 -101; A. 3-5. Capato 
signed these disclaimers as well. Id. However, she maintains she did not sign them. 
R. 58-59 and 70-71. Upon Capato's request, the Garff defendants produced all the signed 
documents for handwriting analysis. R. 58-69. There has been no evidence that her 
signatures are not authentic. R. 92 and 129. 
The defendants moved the trial court for summary judgment maintaining that the 
Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale and/or the "As Is - No Warranty" and "Nothing 
Owed/Nothing Promised" documents precluded Capato's suit. R. 88-89. Oral argument 
was heard by the trial court on March 2, 1998. On March 16, 1998, the trial court, 
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considering the Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale, the "As Is - No Warranty" and "Nothing 
Owed/Nothing Promised" disclaimers, and the absence of any specific oral representations 
or advertising that allegedly induced Capato to buy the car, entered its Minute Entry grant-
ing the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 134-37; A. 7-10. 
B. Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review, with Citation to 
Record. 
On June 1, 1996 Carol Capato purchased from Tena Holbrook a used 1986 
Mercedes 190E that had 126,850 miles on it. R. 63-65, 97-98, and 102; A. 1-2, and 6. 
On July 3, 1996, Capato was traveling east on 1-80 towards Evanston, Wyoming in the 
1986 Mercedes. R. 92. The air bag deployed. Id. The odometer showed 129,266 miles. 
Id. In other words, plaintiff drove the vehicle more than 2,400 miles after she purchased 
it on June 1, 1996. R. 65, 92, and 102. 
The Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale explicitly stated the ten-year-old Mercedes was 
sold without any warranty, express or implied. R. 63-64 and 97-98; A. 1-2. Capato 
signed this contract. Id. andR. 129; A.M. Also, the ten-year-old Mercedes was sold to 
Capato "As Is - No Warranty" and with "Nothing Owed/Nothing Promised." R. 61, 99 -
101; A. 3-5. Capato signed both of these disclaimers. Id. Capato has presented no 
evidence to the contrary despite requesting and receiving all signed documents for 
handwriting analysis. R. 58-69 and 92. 
The Mercedes was a consignment vehicle owned by Tena Holbrook, not Garff 
Enterprises. R. 132; A. 17. Capato was told that the Mercedes was a consignment 
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vehicle. R. 132-33; A. 17-18. She was also told that it did not go through the extended 
Garff inspection checklist. Id. She was also told she could buy a warranty, but she chose 
not to do so. R. 129-31; A. 14-16. 
The cause of the air bag's deployment has not been determined. Capato merely 
asserts that it was caused by the drive-line flex-disk. R.3. Assuming the air bag did 
deploy due to the failure of a part, the failure occurred after ten years and nearly 130,000 
miles of driving. R. 92. 
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Capato bought a ten-year-old car, with 126,853 miles on it, pursuant to a Motor 
Vehicle Contract of Sale. R. 63-65, 97-98 and 102; A. 1-2 and 6. There is no genuine 
issue of material fact as to the terms of the sale. The Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale "No 
Warranty, Express or Implied" provision, the "As Is - No Warranty" form, and the 
"Nothing Owed/Nothing Promised" form terms are spelled out in big, black, bold, letters 
on disclaimers bearing Capato's signature. R. 61, 63-64, 97-98, 99, and 101.; A. 1-5. 
This car was bought without a warranty. In fact, Capato knew she could purchase a 
warranty, but she chose not to do so. R. 129-31; A. 14-16. As a matter of law, under the 
terms of sale, Capato bore the risk of buying a ten-year-old used car. She drove the car 
more than 2,400 miles after the purchase. R. 65, 92, and 102; A. 6. A part failed, as 
parts in older used cars are known to do. Although this is unfortunate, it is not a basis to 




THIS COURT SHOULD PRESUME THE CORRECTNESS 
OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION BECAUSE CAPATO 
HAS NOT PROPERLY PREPARED OR CITED TO THE 
RECORD ON APPEAL. 
Capato has failed to compile and properly cite to the Record on Appeal. Capato's 
memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment is not in the 
Record on Appeal. Under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, it is the 
appellant's duty to insure that the record is complete and properly addresses the issues 
raised on appeal. See Utah R. App. P. Rule 11; see also J&M Construction, Inc. v. 
Southam, 722 P.2d 779, 780 (Utah Ct. App. 1986) ("It is the appellant's responsibility to 
mar shall all the relevant evidence in the record to support its contentions on appeal.") 
(citations omitted). The consequence for leaving the record incomplete is this Court's 
presumption that the trial court's ruling was correct. State v. Rowlings, 829 P.2d 150, 152 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("In the absence of an adequate record on appeal, we cannot address 
the issues raised and will presume the correctness of the disposition made by the trial 
court) (citing State v. Cash, 727 P.2d 218 (Utah 1986) and Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 
998 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989)); see also Horton v. Gem 
State Mut., 794 P.2d 847 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (If the record before the appellate court 
is incomplete, the court is unable to review the evidence as a whole and must therefore 
presume that the verdict was supported by admissible and competent evidence). 
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Despite the fact that her memorandum in opposition to defendants' summary 
judgment is not in the record, Capato cites to it repeatedly in her brief. See Brief of 
Appellant, pp. 2-5. Further, she attempts to circumvent the Record on Appeal and attach 
her memorandum as an addendum to her brief. See Brief of Appellant, p. 3, 11. 1-5 and 
Addendum, pp. 4-34. Unfortunately for Capato, under Rule 24(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, she cannot cite to materials outside the Record on Appeal. Utah 
appellate courts have "repeatedly noted that [they] will not accept as true factual 
allegations in briefs not properly cited to the record." Butler Crockett & Walsh Dev. 
Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225 (Utah 1995); see also Uckerman 
v. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978) ("This Court need not, 
and will not, consider any facts not properly cited to, or supported by, the record). 
Further, "an appellant's failure to cite to the record in a brief is grounds for assuming 
regularity in the proceedings and correctness in the judgment appealed from." Butler, 
Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp., supra at 230 (citing State v. Willett, 909 P.2d 218, 221 
(Utah 1995) and State v. Olmos, 111 P. 2d 287, 287 (Utah 1986); see also Dirks v. 
Cornwell, 754 P.2d 946, 947-48 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("We note initially that defendant's 
brief on appeal fails to conform to Rule 24. We could therefore, sua sponte disregard 
defendant's brief on appeal and assume the correctness of the judgment below."). In 
Butler, Crockett & Walsh, the Utah Supreme Court comments: 
The justification for this rather severe rule is that a "reviewing court is 
entitled to have issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not 
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simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of 
argument and research." 
Id. at 230. 
Simply attaching the omitted portions of the record as an addendum to the 
appellant's brief is not sufficient to complete the record. Rule 24(a)(l 1) proscribes what 
may be included in the addendum.1 Clearly, Rule 24(a) does not legitimize using the 
addendum as the means by which the appellant can freely supplement the Record on 
Appeal. 
2Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(ll) reads: 
(11) . . . The addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of 
central importance cited in the brief but not reproduced 
verbatim in the brief; 
(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of 
Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central 
importance to the appeal but not available to the court as part 
of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central 
importance to determination the appeal, such as the challenged 
instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, memo-
randum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or 
the contract or document subject to construction. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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It is not the appellee's nor this Court's responsibility to insure the Record on Appeal 
is complete. See Butler, Crockett, & Walsh Dev. Corp., supra, and / &MManufacturing, 
supra. As such, this Court is left with the presumption of the trial court's correctness. 
POINT II 
THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT 
THAT THE CAR WAS SOLD WITHOUT A WARRANTY. 
Summary judgment requires there be no genuine issues of material fact. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56(c). There is no issue of material fact in this case. The terms of the sale were 
clear. Defendants made no warranties. 
A. The Terms of the Sale Were Clear and Signed. 
Capato attempts to raise an issue of fact surrounding the "No Warranty" and "As 
Is" terms of the sale. This is a red herring. There is no genuine dispute as to the terms 
of the sale. They were spelled out in big, black, bold letters on three documents bearing 
Capato's signature. First, the Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale reads: 
As stated on the reverse side of this document, unless seller has given to 
Purchaser an Express Warranty in writing, Seller makes no Warranty, 
express or implied, with respect to the merchantability, fitness for particular 
purpose, or otherwise concerning the vehicle, parts or accessories described 
herein. Unless otherwise indicated in writing, any warranty is limited to that 
provided by the manufacturer, if any, as explained and conditioned by 
Paragraph 4 on the reverse side hereof. 
R.63 and 97, A. 1. The reverse side of the contract reads in bold and capital letters: 
NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE BY THE 
SELLER WITH RESPECT TO USED MOTOR VEHICLES OR 
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MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED HEREUNDER EXCEPT 
AS MAY BE EXPRESSED IN WRITING BY SELLER FOR SUCH 
USED MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS, WHICH 
WARRANTY, IF SO EXPRESSED IN WRITING, IS INCORPO-
RATED HEREIN AND MADE A PART HEREOF. 
R.64and98,A. 2. 
Second, the written warranty statement reads in oversized, bold, capital letters: 
"AS IS - NO WARRANTY" 
"YOU WILL PAY ALL COSTS FOR ANY REPAIRS. The dealer 
assumes no responsibility for any repairs regardless of any oral 
statement made about the vehicle. 
R. 61-62 and 99-100; A. 3. 
Third, the work promised statement reads in oversized, bold, capital letters: 
"WE OWE YOU" 
"Nothing owed/Nothing promised" 
R. 101; A. 5. 
There can be no dispute that she did not know the meaning of the words "As Is," 
"No Warranty," and "Nothing Owed/Nothing Promised." These are not convoluted, fine 
print representations of contractual sales terms. Beyond these disclaimers, defendants 
made it painfully clear to Capato that this was a consignment vehicle sold "As Is" without 
any warranty whatsoever. R. 129-33; A. 14-18. Capato specifically asked about purchas-
ing a warranty for the vehicle. Id. She never purchased one. Id. Illustrating this, 
Capato's deposition testimony was presented to the trial court as follows: 
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"During the time that you were looking into making the acquisition of the 
'86 Mercedes, did you make any inquiry to Tina Holbrook (that was our 
salesperson) as to whether there would be any warranty that attached?" 
She says, "Yeah." 
And I said, "When was that?" 
And Mrs. Capato says: 
"I asked if I could have an extended warranty." 
I asked her: "Tell me when that was." 
She said: "The same day I was acquiring it." 
"OnJune'96?" 
"Yes." 
"You asked Tina?" 
"Yes." 
"For an extended warranty?" 
"Yes." 
And then we continue on over on Page 51: 
"So you asked Tina if you could get an extended warranty. And what did 
Tina tell you?" 
"She would look into it." 
"Was this the end of the conversation with Tina on that subject or was there 
more?" 
The answer: "That was basically, yes, because I was waiting to see if I 
could get it." 
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And then I asked her: "So the last you heard on your request for an 
extended warranty was, 'I will look into it?"' 
Her answer: "I'm looking, yes." 
Then I asked her: "Did you understand that the extended warranty was 
something that would have to be purchased?" 
Her answer was: "I didn't mind purchasing, you know, an extended 
warranty. I wanted one." 
And then I asked her: "You knew an extended warranty didn't come for 
free?" 
She said, "Actually, I didn't know a whole lot about it. I just knew it was 
a good idea. I wanted to get one. Yes, I knew it didn't come for free." 
"Any other discussions with Tina?" 
She says, "Not that I can recall." 
Then on Page 54 of her own deposition, she admits she knew the car was ten 
years old, had over a hundred thousand miles on it. 
Then on to Page 55, back to this subject about an extended warranty: 
* * * 
"— up until the 3rd of July, did you make any additional efforts toward 
obtaining the extended warranty?" 
"Yes." 
I asked her to tell me what. 
"I called there to ask for Tina, and they would say she was out or with 
someone and I had to leave a message." 
Then I go on: "Did you have any conversations with Tina?" 
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Down at the bottom she says: 
"No, I never got to find out." 
Basically, this is the Plaintiff: "I never got to find out about the extended 
warranty." 
At the top of Page 57: "Did you speak to anyone else at Ken Garff during 
that time about the subject of your desire to acquire an extended warranty?" 
Her answer was: "When I asked her or talking to her, this other man who 
was writing up the papers, the finance guy, was there. I didn't really talk 
to him about it." 
And then I asked her a few more questions in the middle of Page 57: 
"Did you talk to anybody?" 
"Answer: No." 
R. 130-31; A. 15-16 (quoting Deposition of Carol Capato pp. 49,51,54-57). 
In support of her argument that the terms of the sale were unclear, Capato cites 
Thomas v. Ruddle Lease - Sales, Inc., 716 P.2d 911, 915 (Wash. App. 1986). Unfor-
tunately for Capato, Thomas is of no use to her. In Thomas, the car salesman told the used 
car buyer that the "As Is" disclaimer was as only applicable in narrow circumstances 
involving engine wear due to high performance driving. Id. at 913 and 915. The used car 
developed problems beyond engine wear and the dealer tried to engage the disclaimer. 
Therefore, the parties' understanding and representations of what "As Is" meant was a 
factual issue. In contrast, there is no dispute as to what "As Is - No Warranty" meant and 
applied to in Capato's case. The disclaimers were clear and understood by Capato and she 
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has not presented any evidence that the defendants ever misrepresented the meaning and 
breadth of the disclaimers. There is no jury question here. See Tibbetts v. Openshaw, 
425 P.2d 160 (Utah 1967) (Upholding trial court's refusal to present jury instruction 
regarding warranty terms when purchaser failed to present clear and convincing evidence 
that the "As Is" term of sale was misunderstood.) 
Capato further attempts to raise a factual issue based on the "Nothing Owed/ 
Nothing Promised" disclaimer. R. 101. Capato attempts to cast this document as a 
confusing representation of the vehicle's condition. See Brief of Appellant, p. 7. Capato 
is mistaken. This disclaimer indicates that the sale to Capato was free and clear and that 
no service was promised to Capato and no service was owed — nothing else. There is 
nothing in this document that indicates the condition of the vehicle or that it was a "perfect 
car." R. 132; A. 17. This disclaimer is as clear as it could possibly be. At the top it 
reads in big, black, block letters: "WE OWE YOU." R. 101; A. 5. Under that it reads 
in plain black print "Nothing Owed/Nothing Promised." Id. At the bottom of this dis-
claimer is Capato's signature. Id. 
Capato cites to Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978) for the generic 
principle that if the interpretation of a fact is disputed, summary judgment is not 
appropriate. More accurately, an issue of fact must be "genuine" to preclude summary 
judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also First American Title Insurance Co. v. J.B. 
Ranch, Inc., 1998 WL 234063 (Utah May 12, 1998). While Capato may assert that these 
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terms have meanings different from their plain and common usage, this dispute is not 
"genuine." These terms are clear and easily understood. There is no room for confusion 
or dispute here. 
B. Capato Signed the Disclaimers. Her Assertion That She Did Not Is a Red Herring. 
Capato attempts to create an issue of fact by denying that it was indeed her signature 
we see at the bottom of the "As Is - No Warranty" and "Nothing Owed/Nothing 
Promised" disclaimers. This too is a red herring. Upon Capato's request, all documents 
in defendants' possession bearing Capato's signature were transferred to Capato for hand-
writing analysis. Since then, there has been no evidence offered that these are not her 
signatures at the bottom of these documents. R. 92 and 129. In other words, the only 
evidence that these are not her signatures is her own testimony. Capato's unsupported 
testimony alone is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. The U.S. Supreme Court 
stated regarding summary judgment: 
If the defendant in a run-of-the-mill civil case moves for summary judgment 
. . . based on the lack of proof of material fact, the judge must ask himself 
not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakenly favors one side over the 
other, but whether a fair minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff 
on the evidence presented. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence 
in support of plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be 
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. The 
judge's inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks whether reasonable jurors 
could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is 
entitled to a verdict. 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (emphasis added). In other 
words, if the non-moving party cannot muster sufficient evidence to make out a triable 
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issue of fact, a trial on the issue would be useless and the moving party entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law. Id. Further, the Utah Supreme Court states: 
An affidavit which merely reflects the affiant's unsubstantiated conclusions 
and which fails to state evidentiary facts is insufficient to create an issue of 
fact. 
Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985). 
Regardless of any dispute surrounding the signatures on the "As Is - No Warranty" 
and "Nothing Owed/Nothing Promised" disclaimers, there is no dispute as to whether 
Capato signed the Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale. R. 129, A. 14. She admits she signed 
it. Id. She signed the contract in three separate places. R.63 and 97, A. 1. Her signa-
tures are dated June 1, 1996. Id. The contract of sale has two express disclaimers of 
warranty. See id. p. 8; R. 63-64 and 97-98; A. 1-2. Therefore, even if this Court accepts 
Capato's assertion that there is a factual dispute regarding the signatures on the "As Is -
No Warranty" and "Nothing Owed/Nothing Promised" disclaimers, there is no dispute 
Capato signed the contract of sale which, by its own terms, disclaims and clearly enun-
ciates the absence of any warranty on the Mercedes. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that her confirmed signature on the contract of sale 
is identical to her signatures on the "As Is" and "Nothing Owed" disclaimers. See R. 129, 
61-63, and 98-101; A. 14, 1-3. Upon inspection of these documents and signatures, this 
Court will find that clearly the signatures on all the documents are from the same hand. 
As such, this Court may conclude, without the assistance of a handwriting expert, that 
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Capato's denial that she signed the disclaimers is false testimony. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-25-10;2 see also Tucker v. Kellog, 28 P. 870, 870 (Utah 1892) ("[I]f a paper admitted 
to be in the handwriting of the party, or to have been subscribed by, is in evidence . . ., 
the signature or paper in question may be compared by the jury, with or without the aid 
of experts.") Further, if Capato has testified falsely, the remainder of her testimony may 
be disregarded except as corroborated by other credible evidence. JIFU 3.13 (citing 
Gittens v. Lundberg, 284 P.2d 1115 (Utah 1955)). Consequently, Capato's lack of cor-
roborating evidence undercuts her argument that a factual dispute exists over the signatures 
on the disclaimers. 
C. Defendants Made No Express Warranties to Capato. 
The pivotal question is "did the parties agree to a warranty?" In answering this 
question, the court must look to the written contract. U. C. C. Series, Article 2, p. 588 
(citations omitted). Written on the signed contractual documents in bold, black, oversized 
print are the words "NO WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED," "AS IS -
NO WARRANTY," and "Nothing owed/Nothing promised." R. 61, 63-64, 97-98, 99, 
and 101; A. 1-5. In addition to the clear terms, Capato asked about warranties, to which 
defendants answered there is none. R. 129-31; A. 14-16. She knew she could purchase 
a warranty and chose not to do so. Id. 
2Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-10 reads: If the subscribing witness denies or does not 
recollect the execution of the writing, its execution may still be proved by other evidence. 
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Express warranties are not created when the facts show that any such warranties 
were taken out of the sales agreement. Jensen v. Seigel Mobile Homes Group, 668 P.2d 
65 (Idaho 1983). Citing Comment No. 3 of U.CC. Section 2-313, the Idaho Supreme 
Court stated: 
Express warranties will not be created when there is clear proof of some 
fact which took the affirmation or description out of the agreement, . . . 
Id. at 71 {emphasis added). Undoubtedly, plaintiffs signatures on the "No Warranty, 
Express or Implied. . .," "As Is - No Warranty," and "Nothing Owed/Nothing Promised" 
disclaimers is just such a fact. 
Under Jensen, any alleged express warranty would be extinguished by Capato's 
acknowledgment of the disclaimers. Jensen negates Capato's claim that a statement that 
the car had been "checked out" or was a "perfect car" was an express warranty. R. 132; 
A. 17. Although defendants deny ever representing to Capato that the car was "perfect" 
or had undergone Garff s used car inspection, in any event, such statements would not 
constitute an express warranty in the wake of the signed disclaimers. See Jensen. 
Furthermore, defendants' alleged statements that the Mercedes was a "perfect car," 
"well taken care of," "well maintained," "inspected," and "in the Garff family" do not 
rise to the level of express warranties. R. 132. In Royal Business Machines, Inc. v. 
Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1980), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals states: 
General statements to the effect that goods are "the best," or are "of good 
quality," or will "last a lifetime" and be "in perfect condition" are generally 
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regarded as expressions of the seller's opinion or "the puffing of his wares" 
and do not create an express warranty. 
Id at 42. 
Additionally, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri 
recently stated that statements such as "ABS brakes are 99 percent more effective than 
other protective systems" and "the driver is 100 times more likely to benefit from this 
vehicle's crash-avoidance capabilities" are not express warranties and cannot support a 
warranty cause of action. In re General Motors Anti-Lock Brake Products Liability 
Litigation, 965 F.Supp. 1525 (E.D. Mo. 1997). 
Contrary to Capato's beliefs, this sale does not create a guarantee that all parts of 
this car will last forever. Furthermore, Capato received and signed a list of some major 
defects that may occur in her vehicle. R. 62 and 100; A. 3. Included in this list is a risk 
of a "faulty transmission or drive shaft." Id. This would encompass the flex disk that 
Capato alleges failed. In other words, plaintiff was well aware of the potential for defects 
and breakdowns in her used vehicle. The concept that parts fail in an older, highly used 
vehicle is not a novel one. 
Capato attempts to transform the express warranty issue into a jury question. 
Contrary to Capato's assertion, there is no jury question here. The documents signed by 
Capato make one thing clear above all else — "NO WARRANTY." 
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D. Advertisements Are Not Express Warranties for Old Cars. 
Capato argues that Garff s advertisements constitute an express warranty. This is 
not the case. Logic alone tells us that any Garff advertisement could not be construed as 
an express warranty that parts on a ten-year-old car with 129,000 miles on it will perform 
forever. Although advertisements may constitute express warranties in instances of new 
products advertised for a certain use, this is not the case here. The cases plaintiff cites 
illustrate this point as all involve written representations as to the quality of new goods 
sold. See, Jensen v. Seigel Mobile Homes Group, 668 P.2d 65 (Idaho 1983) (purchase of 
a new mobile home); Touchet Valley Grain v. Opp & Seibold, 831 P.2d 724 (Wash. 1992) 
(collapse of a new grain storage building); Deaton, Inc. v. Arrowglide Corp., 657 P.2d 
109 (N.M. 1982) (purchase of new pickup truck that had modifications); State By Division 
of Consumer Protection v. GAP, Corp., 760 P.2d 310 (Utah 1988) (installation of new 
asphalt shingles). It should be pointed out that none of these cases stands for the 
proposition that generic statewide advertisements create infinite express warranties on 
ten-year-old used cars. See Mason v. Chrysler Corp., 653 So.2d 951 (Ala. 1995) 
(National advertisements regarding the quality of Chrysler Fifth Avenue and the 
accompanying warranty did not give rise to fraudulent misrepresentation claim after 
vehicle broke down after less than one year of use). 
Interestingly, Capato cites to Welchman v. Wood, 353 P.2d 165, 167 (Utah 1960) 
to support her argument that Garff s advertisement was a promise to respond in damages 
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in the occurrence of a future event. Welchman is not applicable because in this case the 
future event would be the failure of a used car part. Although an interesting argument, 
logic alone tells us an advertisement is not a guarantee that a ten-year-old used car will last 
forever and if it does not, the advertiser is liable at any point in the future. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS 
A MATTER OF LAW. 
Summary judgment also requires that the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). As a matter of law, the "No Warranty, Express 
or Implied," "As Is - No Warranty," and "Nothing Owed/Nothing Promised" terms of 
sale, the lack of a defective product, and the lack of any evidence of fraud negate all of 
Capato's claims. 
A. The "No Warranty. Express or Implied" and "As Is - No Warranty" 
Language Terminated All Implied and Express Warranties. 
Capato contends that the "No Warranty, Express or Implied" and "As Is - No 
Warranty" disclaimers apply only to implied warranties. This is not the case. Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-2-316(3)(a) includes the termination of express as well as implied warranties. 
Under Uniform Commercial Code § 2-316(3)(a), adopted verbatim at Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-2-316(3)(a), "No Warranty, Express or Implied," "As Is - No Warranty," and 
"Nothing Owed/Nothing Promised" effectively exclude any and all warranty claims Capato 
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asserts. 77A CJS Sales, § 270 (citations omitted). Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-316(3)(a) 
reads: 
(a) Unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties 
are excluded by expressions like "as is," "with all faults," or other language 
which in common understanding calls all the buyer's attention to the 
exclusion of warranties and makes plain there is no implied warranty. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Although a statute specifically states "implied warranties" it also makes reference 
to "the exclusion of warranties." The language indicates that all warranties can be 
excluded by "No Warranty" and "As Is"- type terms. This is supported by Official 
Comment No. 7 to U.C.A. § 2-316 which states: 
7. (a) of Subsection (3) deals with general terms such as "as is," "as 
they stand," "with all faults," and the like. Such terms in ordinary 
commercial uses are understood that the buyer takes "the entire risk as 
to the quality of the goods involved." 
(Emphasis added.) The term "entire risk" leaves little doubt that "As Is" and 
"No Warranty" can exclude express, as well as implied warranties. Case law affirms this 
point. As an example, in Nick Miklacki Const. Co. v. M.J.L. Truck Sales, Inc., 
515 N.E.2d 24 (Ohio App. 1986), the Ohio Court of Appeals used Comment No. 7 as the 
basis for holding that "As Is" was an effective disclaimer of express and implied 
warranties. In Miklacki, the buyer of a used dump truck, which was advertised as having 
a rebuilt engine, experienced engine trouble shortly after purchase. However, because the 
truck was sold "As Is," the buyer could not hold the seller liable for the cost of repairing 
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the truck. The buyer in Miklacki, like the plaintiff, argued that "As Is" applies only to 
implied warranties. However, the court responded that "As Is" also can entail the 
termination of any express warranties. Id. 
Also, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey held that the 
"As Is" provision of a contract for sale of used school buses precluded claims for breach 
of implied or express warranties. In Trailways Finance and Acceptance Corp. v. Euro-flo 
Tours, 572 F.Supp 1227 (D.N.J. 1983), the court stated: 
The language of the "As Is" provision of the contract precisely precludes 
claims of misrepresentation or breach of any express or implied warranties 
of fitness or merchantability. 
Id. at 1230. 
Similarly, the Florida Court of Appeals held that where certain documents signed 
by a Volkswagen car buyer provided the dealer with selling the car "As Is" and was 
disclaiming all warranties and that the only warranty on the car was that of the manu-
facturer, the dealer effectively avoided the making of any warranties. Frank Griffin 
Volkswagen, Inc. v. Smith, 610 So.2d 597 (Fla. App. 1992). 
Finally, the California Court of Appeals held that a written agreement in which a 
skier accepted rental equipment "As Is" exculpated the rental company from any liability 
for breach of express or implied warranty. Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc., 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 
781 (Ca. App. 1993). In Westlye, the skier, like Capato, brought claims for breach of 
express and implied warranty after the alleged failure of ski bindings. The skier, like 
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Capato, signed a written agreement which clearly indicated the bindings were provided 
"As Is." Upholding the trial court's dismissal of the warranty claims against the rental 
shop, the court stated: 
The trial court determined the written agreement barred these counts as 
against Klein's. We agree with the trial court that the written agreement on 
its face exculpates Klein's from any liability for warranty liability. 
Id at 800. 
As for Utah, the Utah Supreme Court has upheld an auto dealer's disclaimer of all 
of its warranties under UCA § 70A-2-316. In Billings Yamaha v. Rick Warner Ford, 681 
P.2d 1276 (Utah 1984), the Court enforced Rick Warner's express disclaimers of 
warranties contained in the sales contract. The court stated: 
As a matter of law, these disclaimers effectively limited plaintiff's remedy 
to the manufacturer's express warranties, discussed above. 
Id. at 1278 (citing UCA § 70A-2-316). Although in Billings, the sales contract did not 
contain the term "As Is," the Court nevertheless acknowledged an auto dealer's ability to 
limit the dealers warranties associated with the sale of an auto. In the present case, 
defendant Garff did exactly what the courts have always approved of — namely, 
disclaiming any warranty via the "No Warranty, Express or Implied," "As Is - No 
Warranty," and "Nothing Promised/Nothing Owed" provisions of the sales contract. 
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B. Plaintiff Has No Strict Liability Claim Because the Car Was Not Defective. 
Capato argues that her strict liability claim survives the "As Is - No Warranty" 
disclaimer. However, Capato's argument lacks one crucial and necessary element — 
a defective product. Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(1) and (2) reads: 
In any action for damages for personal injury, death, or property damage 
allegedly caused by a defect in a product: 
(1) No product shall be considered to have a defect or to be in a defective 
condition, unless at the time the product was sold by the manufacturer 
or other initial seller, there was a defect or defective condition in the 
product which made the product unreasonably dangerous to the user 
or consumer. 
(2) As used in this act, "unreasonably dangerous" means that the product 
was dangerous to an extent beyond which would be contemplated by 
the ordinary and prudent buyer, consumer, or user of that product in 
that community considering the product's characteristics, propen-
sities, risks, dangers and uses together with any actual knowledge, 
training, or experience possessed by that particular buyer, user or 
consumer. 
See also, Nay v. General Motors Corp., GMC Truck £>/v., 850 P.2d 1260 (Utah 1993) 
(citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(1)) (failure of steering in new truck with approximately 
1,000 miles on it). 
A used Mercedes-Benz is not a defective product. There is no indication that 
Capato's Mercedes was defective at the time the product was sold new in 1986. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence the car was defective or that the defendants had or 
should have had any knowledge of defects at the time was car was sold to Capato. This 
vehicle drove without incident for 129,000 miles. It was not as if the part failed after one 
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month and only 1,000 miles as in Nay, supra. A ten-year-old Mercedes-Benz is 
undoubtedly not an "unreasonably dangerous" product in any community nor is it 
"dangerous to an extent beyond which would be contemplated by" Capato. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-15-6(2). The trial judge agreed stating: "I would expect that car to go 300,000 
miles because it is a Mercedes-Benz." R. 131; A. 16. Furthermore, it should be pointed 
out that Capato had the car independently safety inspected prior to her purchase. Id. It 
passed the safety inspection. Id. 
Capato argues the "No Warranty" and "As Is" disclaimers do not preclude her 
personal injury claim. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 10-11. To make this argument, Capato 
must pin her claim to a defective product. Waggoner v. Town & Country Mobile Homes, 
Inc., 808 P.2d 649, 652 (Okla. 1990). In support, Capato cites to Waggoner and Wade 
v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991). These cases show the fundamental flaw in her 
argument. Waggoner and Wade are defective products/product liability cases. As stated 
above, a ten-year-old Mercedes is not a defective product by any community's standards. 
Capato maintains it would be "unconscionable" to limit defendants' liability for injuries 
caused by a defective product. See Brief of Appellant, p. 11. In fact, what is truly 
"unconscionable" is Capato's assumption that the vehicle was defective and Capato's 
explanation that all parts of a ten-year-old car would work without fail for an infinite 
period of time. There is no defective product in this case. Therefore, there is no avenue 
of liability on these grounds. 
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Capato attempts to create a factual dispute that this product was indeed defective. 
This argument is a red herring. As such, it should not preclude the trial court's summary 
judgment. 
C. The As Is - No Warranty Disclaimer Precludes Capato's Negligence Claim. 
Under the "No Warranty, Express or Implied" and "As Is - No Warranty" terms 
of sale, Capato bore the entire risk of the quality of the Mercedes. Under "As Is -
No Warranty" reads: 
YOU WILL PAY ALL COSTS FOR ANY REPAIRS. The dealer assumes 
no responsibility for any repairs regardless of any oral statements about the 
vehicle. 
R. 61 and 99; A. 3. As set forth in greater detail above, "As Is" when used in ordinary 
commercial usage means "the buyer takes the 'entire risk as to the quality of the goods 
involved.'" Official Comment No. 7 of U.C.C. § 2-316 adopted at Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-2-316(3)(a). The failure of parts is a risk of ownership of an older automobile. If 
plaintiff did not wish to take this risk, she could have spent her $10,000.00 on a new car 
rather than a ten-year-old Mercedes-Benz. This was a risk Capato knowingly and volun-
tarily accepted. R. 129-32; A. 14-17. 
This risk entailed the quality of the goods at the time of sale. R. 61, 63-64, 98, and 
99; A. 1-4. Inclusive in the quality of the car at the time of sale was the service performed 
over the ten-year life of the car. Capato has presented no evidence beyond her unsup-
ported assertion in her complaint that the defendants were either negligent in their alleged 
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inspection of the car or that that negligence had any relation to the accident and damages 
suffered by Capato. As stated above, a single unsupported assertion by the non-moving 
party is not sufficient to create a jury issue. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All 
U.S. 242, 248 (1986) and Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723. This is not a res ipsa loquitur 
case. 
Capato argues that the exclusion of implied warranties does not preclude a negli-
gence claim. Brief of Appellant, p. 10. She is incorrect. Indeed, warranty and negligence 
claims are separate causes of action but, as in this case, clear and explicit disclaimers can 
abrogate both. Interestingly, one of the cases Capato cites supports this point. In Elite 
Professional v. Carrier Corp., 827 P.2d 1195 (Kan. App. 1992), the court acknowledged 
contracting parties' ability to disclaim warranties as well as the ability to disclaim liability 
for their own negligence as long as done clearly and unequivocally. The court states: 
. . . [Effective disclaimer of liability for one's own negligence, waiver of 
liability of the other party for the latter's negligence, or indemnification of 
the other party for its negligence is subject to strict construction and explicit 
expression. 
Id. at 1202 (citations omitted). 
D. Capato Has No Fraud Claim. 
Although Capato has alleged fraudulent representation, she has not alleged or 
presented any evidence that these representations induced her to purchase the Mercedes 
or that they were a "basis of the bargain." Without such a showing, Capato has no fraud 
claim. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-313; TSl Partnership v. Allred, 877 P.2d 156 (Utah 
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Ct. App. 1994) (Failure to show lessee's representations induced the lessor to sign the 
lease negates fraud claim). The basis of the bargain between Capato and Holbrook is 
contained in the contract of sale and the "As Is" and "Nothing Owed/Nothing Promised" 
disclaimers and an odometer statement showing 126,850 miles. Any alleged statements 
and advertisements above and beyond the clear terms of the sale are not express warranties 
and do not give rise to a fraud cause of action. Mason v. Chrysler Corp., 653 So. 2d 951 
(Ala. 1995) (National advertisements regarding the quality of Chrysler Fifth Avenue and 
the accompanying warranty did not give rise to fraudulent misrepresentation claim after 
vehicle broke down after less than one year of use.) 
Capato cites to Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974) for the proposition that 
her fraud claim survives the "As Is" disclaimers. The facts and disclaimer mLamb are 
far different than those presently at hand. Unlike the present case, in Lamb, the seller's 
fraudulent conduct went to the basis of the bargain. The seller represented to the buyers 
that the bull they were buying was a "breeder" when in fact the seller knew he was sterile. 
The Lamb jury found the seller had willfully misrepresented the reproductive capabilities 
of the bull to the buyer and therefore, the appellate court held the contract of sale's 
exclusive remedy provision did not apply. There was no "As Is" disclaimer on the bull. 
In contrast, Capato knew the Mercedes was a ten-year-old car, it had 126,850 miles, was 
purchased "As Is," and parts of the car might fail in the not-so-distant future. See R. 130 
(citing Deposition of Capato, p. 54), 62, and 100; A. 15 and 4. In other words, unlike the 
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buyer in Lamb, Capato knew the bull was sterile. In Lamb, the disclaimer was obtained 
through deceit. Consequently, its effect was negated. Such is not the case here. 
IX. CONCLUSION, WITH STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based on the foregoing, the defendants respectfully submit the trial court's decision 
was correct and should be affirmed by this court. 
DATED this 15 day of October, 1998. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By:_ N- IjC^cM^jrt^ 
Robert H. Henderson 
Scott H. Martin 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees Garff 
Enterprises and Tena Holbrook 
N:\8862\6\BRIEF.APP 
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iTRUCTION One of the two following disclosures either "A" or "B" must be acknowledged If 
Purchaser agrees to be responsible for financing or if this is a cash-only or cash plus trade-in only 
transaction then Purchaser must sign disclosure*'A" If Seller agrees to arrange for financing then both 
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W THE PURCHASER OF THE MOTGR VEHICLE DESCRIBED IN THIS CONTRACT ACKNOWL-
EDGES THAT THE SELLER OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE HAS MADE NO PROMISES WARRANTIES. 
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18 SUB TOTAL-TAXABLE ITEMS (total lines 15 17) 
19 TRADE ALLOWANCE (line 10) 
20 NET TAXABLE AMOUNT 
(line 18 minus line 19) 9453.00 
21 UTAH SALES/USE TAX ON "TAXABLE AMOUNT" 
22 LICENSE & REGISTRATION FEES 
23 PROPERTY TAX DUE ON TRADE IN 
24 STATE INSPECTION/EMISSIONS TEST 
25 STATE WASTE TIRE RECYCLING FEE * 
26 FEDERAL LUXURY TAX 
27 DEALER DOCUMENTARY SERVICE FEE 
28 * 
29 TOTAL OF ALL ITEMS ABOVE (lines 18 21 27) 
30 TOTAL CREDITS (line 14) 
31 B A L A N C E D U E (total line 29 minus 30) 







SELLER AGREES TO ARRANGE FINANCING 
M (B ) M THE PURCHASER OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE DESCRIBED IN THIS CONTRACT HAS 
EXECUTED THE CONTRACT IN RELIANCE UPON THE SELLERS REPRESENTATION THAT 
SELLER CAN PROVIDE FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PURCHASE OF THE MOTOR 
VEHICLE THE PRIMARY TERMS OF THE FINANCING ARE AS FOLLOWS 
INTEREST RATE BETWEEN 2 5 . 9 Q , AND _ _ ? _ _ _ _ _ _ % PER ANNUM TERM BETWEEN 
? 4 MONTHS AND _ ^ ? MONTHS MONTHLY PAYMENTS 
BETWEEN $ 2 3 8 . 9 7 PER MONTH AND $ 9 6 3 . 9 7 PER MONTH BASED 
ON A DOWN PAYMENT OF $ 5000.00 
IF SELLER IS NOT ABLE TO ARRANGE FINANCING WITHIN THE TERMS DISCLOSED THEN 
SELLER MUST WITHIN SEVEN CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF SALE MAIL NOTICE TO THE 
PURCHASER THAT HE/SHE HAS NOT BEEN ABLETO ARRANGE FINANCING PURCHASER THEN 
HAS 14 DAYS FROM DATE OF SALE TO ELECT IF HE/SHE CHOOSES TO RESCIND THE 
CONTRACT OF SALE PURSUANT TO SECTION 41 3 401 
IN ORDER TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT OF SALE THE PURCHASER SHALL 
(1) RETURN TO SELLER THE MOTOR VEHICLE PURCHASED 
(2) PAY THE SELLER 30 CENTS FOR EACH Ml LE THE MOTOR VEHICLE HAS BEEN DRIVEN AND 
(3) COMPENSATE SELLER FOR ANY PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE MOTOR VEHICLE 
IN RETURN SELLER SHALL GIVE BACK TO THE PURCHASER ALL PAYMENTS OR OTHER 
CONSIDERATION PAID BY THE PURCHASER INCLUDING ANY DOWN PAYMENT AND ANY 
MOTOR VEHICLE TRADED IN IF THE TRADE IN HAS BEEN SOLD OR OTHERWISE DISPOSED OF 
BEFORE THE PURCHASER RESCINOS THE TRANSACTION THEN THE SELLER SHALL RETURN 
TO THE PURCHASER A SUM EQUIVALENT TO THE ALLOWANCE TOWARD THE PURCHASE 




( > 5 0 0 0 . 0 Q 
5237.50 
Purchaser has arranged insurance on vehicle through . . insurance company Policy! 
As is stated on the reverse side of this document unless Seller has given to Purchaser an Express Warranty in writing Sellermakes no Warranty express or implied with respect to the merchantability 
fitness for particular purpose or otherwise concerning the vehicle parts or accessones descnbed herein Unless otherwise indicated in writing any warranty is limited to that provided by the 
manufacturer if any as explained and conditioned by Paragraph 4 on the reverse side hereof 
Purchaser agrees that this contract includes all of the terms conditions and warranties on both the face and reverse side hereof that this agreement cancels and supersedes any pnor agreement and as of 
the date hereof comprises the complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement relating to the subject matters covered herBby\PURCHASER BY HIS/HER EXECUTION OF THIS 
AGREEMENT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT HE/SHE HAS READ ITS TERMS CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES BOTH ON THE FACE AND WyREVJfiSE SIDE HEREOF AND HAS RECEIVED A TRUE 
C O P Y ^ F W S AGREEMENT AND FURTHER AGREES TO PAY THFJBAkANCE DUE" SET FORTH ABOVE ON OR BEFORE THE D// 
STATURE " N 
Q^PUWCHASER^- i -
SIGNATURE 
OF CO PURCHASER . r-?G 
> CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES '«33 
I T I S ^ F U R T H E R UNDERSTOOD AND MUTUALLY AGREED:' 
-V The agreement on the reverse side hereof is subjectto the following terms, conditions, and warranties made by Purchaser, which 
have been mutually agreed upo^'^f^v^cy-MClO^ '-'^ ^ ' x .*••.•"• - • • - ; : ' / . • y - * v 
• - : ~ - v : . : : * • • • • • > • v/iv • . i ^ • - - . • - . v . « v „ . •-: •:••••*.'••*•••. j ; v .-•«-, o > j r 
1. Purchaser agrees to deliver the original bill of sale and the title to any used vehicle traded herein along with the delivery of 
.. . such vehicle in the same condition and containing the same equipment as when appraised reasonable wear and tear 
excepted, and Purchaser warrants such used vehicle to be his property free and clear of all liens and encumbrances excepf 
'\ as otherwise noted on the reverse side h e r e o t - ^ o y ^ v ^ ..;:
 : ; v- ~>:z£ 
2. If the Seller does not pay the "BALANCE DUE" by the date indicated on the reverse side of this agreement, then the Seller may 
set off against it's damages any cash deposit or down payment received from the Purchaser. In the event a used vehicie has' 
been taken in trade, Purchaser authorizes Seller to sell the used vehicle, and Seller shall be entitled to reimburse itself out of 
the proceeds of such sale for its expenses and losses incurred or suffered as the result of Purchaser's failure to complete tha 
purchase. . *•'. •'•':':*-o;' ' •• •'''" "•-•'•'.' : •'•'••'••' * . -• • . •. • - T > . \ 
*. , . . , . . . . - , i ; . v : . v ^ - : - • • : • > * • • > y
 : ..•-.,- • - - -';•. v r 
3. Seller shall not be liable for delays or damages caused by the manufacturer, accidents, sureties, fires, or other causes beyond 
thecontrolofiheSellef.[Tv'V; j ; * ; -jv: : " . / ; ; : ; - ^ * " . " * ' • . - . ' 
4. NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE OR WILL BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY EITHER SELLER 
OR THE MANUFACTURER OF THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED HEREUNDER^ 
EXCEPTING ONLY THE CURRENT PRINTED WARRANTY APPLICABLE TO SUCH VEHICLE OR VEHICLE CHASSIS,; 
WHICH WARRANTY IS INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MADE A PART HEREOF AND A COPY OF WHICH WILL BE 
DELIVERED TO PURCHASER AT THE TIME OF DELIVERY OF THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE 
CHASSIS, SUCH WARRANTY SHALL BE EXPRESSLY IN LIEU OF ANY OTHER WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,; 
INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY IMPJJED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE, AND THE REMEDIESPSET FORTH IN SUCH WARRANTY WILL BE THE ONLY REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO ANY 
PERSON WITH RESPECT TO SUCH NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS. 
NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE BY SELLER WITH RESPECT TO USED MOTOR VEHICLES OR 
MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED HEREUNDER EXCEPT AS MAY BE EXPRESSED IN WRITING BY SELLER FOR 
SUCH USED MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS, WHICH WARRANTY, IF SO EXPRESSED IN WRITING, IS 
INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MADE A PART HEREOF. 
5. In case the vehicle sold to Purchaser is a used or demonstrator vehicle, no warranty or representation is made by Seller as to 
the extent such vehicle has been used, regardless of the mileage shown on the odometer of said used vehicle. 
* 6. In the event it becomes necessary for Seller to enforce any of the terms, conditions or warranties in this agreement, Purchaser 
agrees to pay reasonable attorney's fees and court costs. 
7. Purchaser may not transfer or assign his/her interest in this Agreement, unless Seiler consents in writing. 
8. LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR BODILY INJURY AND DAMAGE CAUSED TO OTHERS IS NOT INCLUDED IN THIS 
AGREEMENT. 
9. Purchaser REPRESENTS that he/she is 18 years of age or older. 
10. Purchaser grants to Seiler a purchase money security interest in the purcha sed vehicle and to any proceeds of the vehicle to 
secure full payment of the purchase price. This security interest covers all equipment, accessories, and parts that Purchaser 
adds to the vehicle-Purchaser also grants Seller a security interest in the proceeds of any physical damage insurance policy 
.on the vehicle. 
11. if the vehic'e bought by Purchaser is a used vehicle, the information you see en the window form [Buyer's Guide] for this 
vehicle :s part of this contract. Information on the window form overrides any contrary previsions in this contract of sale. 
12. IN THE CASE OF ANY VEHICLE TRADED IN AS PART OF THE CONSIDERATION TCV/ARD A PURCHASE, PURCHASER 
REPRESENTS AND WARRANTS: 
(a) THAT, UNLESS OTHERWISE DISCLOSED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF, POLLUTION CONTROL EQUIPMENT, 
AIR EAGS AND ALL SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT INSTALLED BY THE MANUFACTURER HAS NOT BEEN 
REMOVED OR RENDERED INOPERATIVE: 
(b) THAT THE YEAR OF MANUFACTURE AND THE BALANCE OWED ON THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE ARE AS STATED ON 
THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF; 
(c) THAT, UNLESS OTHERWISE DISCLOSED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF, THE ODOMETER READING ACCUR- -
ATELY STATES ACTUAL MILES THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE HAS BEEN- DRIVEN; y 
(d) THAT PURCHASER HAS AND WILL PROVIDE TO SELLER GOOD TITLE TO THE TRADED-}?. VEHICLE, AND THAT 
TRANSFER OF THETRADED-IN VEHICLETO SELLER AS A TRADE-IN ON THE PUg^HASE OF ANOTHER VEHICLE IS 
RIGHTFUL; AND 
(e) THAT THE TRADED-IN'VEHICLTHAS NEVER HAD ITS TITLE OR REGISTRATION BRANDED AS "SALVAGED", 
"RESTORED," "REPAIRED," OR SIMILAR TERM, PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. §§41-1a-1«04 AND 41-ta-1005 
OR STATUTE(S) OF ANOTHER STATE SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR IN CONTEXT. \r PURCHASER BREACHES THIS • 
REPRESENTATION AND WARRANTY THEN PURCHASER AGREES TO Sc LIABLE TOR AND PAY r r i c SELLER THE 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TRADE-IN ALLOWANCE AS STATED ON THE REVERSE "IDE A><D THE REDUCED 
VALUE ATTRIBUTABLE TO MISREPRESENTATION REGARDJNG THE TITLE OF; REGISTRATION. 
"'?.. ~.K :'" --:-'': ' otv'.T":^ th?. SaJ-ers security interest in the ve^d-? purchased hy °-..:.-ch-:«=««• r;-r v^ *;- c-jrycr.^ -'s.:cL.'i~g Seiier 
• •:;:•'- v •:-.:>:•:, ~r-x;;/v.v^y cs^sed by ^•^hsse'-'s breach,;f any. of the *-;?:•:•'•••:• -•?•>.: r i;••- prs-cecics •^•a'^apn. 
-c or - ' - 'r.e-se s^oc Vc-reo? sr.za r.e. rieerr^i .••eu$-:.r\3b!e and effec.ve rx/.'.*'::~v.z-\ 
j •:••• -•?. vf 3 vs r : : :c .--ste, if therein '. 





IMPORTANT: Spoken promises are difficult to enforce. Ask the dealer to put all promises in writing. Keep 
this form. ^ -
GrCO\°\ 
VEHICLE MAKE MODEL VIN NUMBER 
DEALER STOCK NUMBER (Ofrtonri) 
WARRANTIES FOR THIS VEHICLE: 
AS IS-NO WARRANTY 
YOU WILL PAY ALL COSTS FOR ANY REPAIRS. The dealer assumes no responsibility for any repairs 
regardless of any oral statements about the vehicle. 
WARRANTY 
• FULL • LIMITED WARRANTY. The dealer will pay % of the labor and % of the parts for the 
covered systems that fail during the warranty period. Ask the dealer for a copy of the warranty 
document for a full explanation of warranty coverage, exclusions, and the dealer's repair 
obligations. Under state law, "implied warranties" may give you even more rights. 
SYSTEMS COVERED: DURATION: 
D SERVICE CONTRACT. A service contract is available at an extra charge on this vehicle. Ask for 
details as to coverage, deductible, price, and exclusions. If you buy a service contract within 90 days of 
the time of sale, state law "implied warranties" may give you additional rights. 
PRE-PURCHASE INSPECTION: ASK THE DEALER IF YOU MAY HAVE THIS VEHICLE INSPECTED BY 
YOUR MECHANIC EITHER ON OR OFF THE LOT. 
SEE THE BACK OF THIS FORM for important additional information, including a list of some major defects 
that may occur in used motor vehicles.' 
FORM BGE-1 
To Order Forms CALL 
INSIDE WASHINGTON 1-800-422-8217 
OUTSIDE WASHINGTON 1-800-826-7095 
7 DAYS A WEEK 
24 HOURS A DAY 
WHOLESALE FORMS 
PATENT NO 4864755 
L\ 
Below is a list of some major defects that may occur in used motor vehicles. 
Frame & Body 
Frame-cracks, corrective welds, or rusted through 
Dogtracks-bent or twisted frame 
Engine 
O.' 'eakage excluding normal seepage 
Cracked biock or head 
Belts miss ng or inoperable 
Knocks or misses rela'ed to camsnaft ''fters and oush rods 
Aonormal exhaust discharge 
Transmission & Drive Shaft 
Improper f'uid Ipvel or leakage, excludmg norma' seepage 
Cracx*a or damaged case which is v s ble 
Abnormal ro.se or vibration causec by faulty transmission 
or dnve shaft 
Improper shifting or fund oning n any gear 
Manua' c Jtch si os or cnatters 
Differential 
l^rrop^ f o d level or lca*>age exdud ng norma: seepage 
C nckec or damaged housing ,vh ch s visible 
Acne na '«o se or vibiatcn caused by faulty d*ferent.a! 
Cooling System 
^eakag-* 'nclud ng radiator 
!nprcf:cr j 'jT.t'onmg water pump 
Electrical System 
Battery leakage 
lmproperly function ng a'ternaic, generator, battery, or staler 
Fuel System 
Vis b e 'e3Kage 
Brake System 
Failure warning light broken 
Pedal not firm under pressure (DOT specs) 
'Not enough pedal reserve (DOT specs } 
Does not stop vehicle in straight line (DOT specs) 
Hoses damaged 
Drum or rotor too thin (Mfgr specs) 
Lining or pad thickness less than 1 '32 inch 
Power unit not operating or leaking 
Structural or mechanical parts damaged 
Steering System^ 
Too much free play at steering wheel (DOT specs) 
Free play in linkage more than 1/4 -rich 
Steer.ng gear b nds or jams 
Front wheel al.gned improperly (DOT specs) 
Power unit belts cracked or slipping 
Power unit fluid level improper 
Suspension System 
Ba!1 joirt seals damaged 
Structural parts bent or damaged 
Stabilizer bar disconnected 
Spring broken 
Shock absorber r cur ting loose 
Rjfcber busnirgs damaged or m ssr.g 
Radius rod damages or missing 
Shcck abscber leaking cr furct or ng improperly 
Tires 




Visib'e CTXKS damage or repa rs 




Gauges or w a n ng dev :es 
Air conditioner 
Hea'e' & Defroster 
bE-f-OH COVr AINTS 
IMPORTANT: The information on tnis form is part of any contract to buy this vehicle. Removal of this label 
before consumer purchase (except for purpose of test-driving) is a violation of federal law (16 C.F.R. £55). 
CUS"!OVCR SIGNATURE _ C *=d£ ^ 
* E G E I P T O F G R . G W A L C C K A O ^ . L E U G C D 
Tab 3 
**Z~umiNSLaB F O R M S (801) 466-9609 
GARFF ENTERPRISES, INC, 
OLDSMOBILE • HYUNDAI 
SAAB • MERCEDES-BENZ • VOLVO 
JAGUAR • HONDA 





WORK PROMISED TO BE PERFORMED AT TIME OF SALE 





NOTE: THE ABOVE PROMISED WORK IS 
ADDITIONAL WORK WILL BE CHARGED 
E ONLY WORK TO BE PERFORMED FREE OF CHARGE. ANY 
DUE TO INSURANCEXEGULATIONS — NO LOAN CARS AVAILABLE 
Signed: Sales Mgr. 
•X- Signed: Custome 
M 
Tab 4 
ODOMETER DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
Federal and State law require that you state the mileage upon transfer of 
ownership. Failure to complete or providing a false statement may result in 
fines and/or imprisonment. 
I, KEN GARFF DWNTWN , (transferor's 
name, Print) state that the odometer of the vehicle described below now reads: 
ODOMETER READING ! 126853 (NO TENTHS) 
miles and to the best of my knowledge that it reflects the actual mileage of the 
vehicle described below, unless one of the following statements is checked. 
Check one box only: 
[ I (1) I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge the odometer reading 
reflects the amount of mileage in excess of its mechanical limits. 
I I (2) I hereby certify that the odometer reading is not the actual mileage. 
WARNING - ODOMETER DISCREPANCY. 
| MAKE" 
MF.RfK 
VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER 
WDBDA24DXGF221523 
Transferor's Signature (SELLER) 











Transferor's Address (Street) 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Oty State ZIP Code 
DATE OF STATEMENT 
01 JUN 1996 
Transferee's Signature (BUYER) 
CAROL S . CAPATO 
CA^CU 'Sutdes, CA9ATCO 
Printed Name 
Transferee's Name 
1787 E. LINCOLN LN 
Transferee's Address (Street) 
HOLIADAY, UT 84124 
City State ZIP Code 
Tab 5 
A.I 
Third .lifiwai District 
MAR 1 6 1998 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




GARFF ENTERPRISES, INC./ KEN 
GARFF/ TENA HOLBROOK and 
DOES 1 through 10 inclusive, 
Defendants• 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 970901748 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment comes before the Court 
pursuant to Rule 4-501. Oral argument was had on March 2, 1998, 
and thereafter the entire deposition of plaintiff was submitted to 
the Court for review in support of the Motion. 
Defendant has provided credible evidence that the plaintiff 
signed a Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale, which specifically says 
that the buyer has seen a copy of the FTC Used Car Buyers Guide. 
This paragraph was specifically signed by the plaintiff. Defendant 
also submits an "As Is-No Warranty" document, also signed by the 
plaintiff, and an additional document entitled "We Owe You" on 
which is written "Nothing owed/Nothing promised", which is also 
signed by the plaintiff. Defendant's argument is that plaintiff 
purchased a car with no warranties, and therefore has no claims 
KM 
CAPATO V. GARFF PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
against the defendant for the accidental discharge of the airbag 
while the vehicle was operating and any injuries attendant thereto. 
Plaintiff responds with a Motion to Compel Discovery and 
Motion to Stay, and the argument that defendant's disclaimers don't 
apply to the causes of action alleged in the Complaint, including 
strict liability, express and implied warranty, negligence and 
fraud. Plaintiff relies upon the advertising and marketing done by 
defendants to the effect that "We stand behind every car we sell", 
"Any purchaser of a used car is entitled to their money back under 
certain conditions", and some possible oral representation that 
this car was thoroughly checked out before the sale, and such an 
inspection would have revealed the defect which resulted in the 
airbag deployment. The plaintiff fails in her deposition, or 
otherwise, to clearly specify any specific oral representations or 
advertising, or marketing, which induced her to buy the car. In 
the absence of anything specific to that effect, and with the 
clear, written waiver signed by the plaintiff, defendant is 
entitled to Summary Judgment. 
Us 
4 |^ 
CAPATO V. GARFF PAGE THREE MINUTE ENTRY 
Counsel for defendant shall prepare an Order consistent with 
this ruling. 
Dated this .day of March, 1998. 
- ,x 
STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
\ • -• / 
£ 
[•^o 
CAPATO V. GARFF PAGE FOUR MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this \D day of March, 
1998: 
Mark DaIton Dunn 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3575 S. Market Street, Suite 206 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
Robert H. Henderson 
Attorney for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 




ROBERT H HENDERSON (A1461) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants Garff Enterprises, Inc., 
and Tena Holbrook 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL CAPATO, ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARFF ENTERPRISES, INC., KEN 
GARFF, TENA HOLBROOK and DOES 1 
through 10 inclusive, 
Defendants. 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly for pursuant to Rule 4-501 
on March 2, 1998. The Court had reviewed the file. The Court fully heard the argument of 
counsel. The Court considers itself fully advised. 
The Court is of the opinion that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff 
purchased the subject vehicle from the defendant "AS - NO WARRANTY" and "NOTHING 
OWED/NOTHING PROMISED." Plaintiff attempts to defeat these facts by contending that 
defendant has well known advertising in this community to the effect "We stand behind every car 
Third v\u>- !--;• District 
APR 1 h 1998 
SAfc-i L^»£-<-^0«M 
L^pJ.y Ci«fk 
Civil No. 970901748 
Judge Stephen L. Henroid 
Yv\ 
we sell," etc. However, the plaintiff fails to clearly specify any specific oral representations or 
advertising or marketing which overcome the written motor vehicle contract of sale "AS IS - NO 
WARRANTY" and 'NOTHING OWED/NOTHING PROMISED." 
Based thereon, NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that judgment be, and 
hereby is, entered in favor of defendants and against plaintiff, no cause of action, together with 
defendants' taxable costs incurred herein in the amount of $ ~~ Q*~ as determined from 
Defendants' Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements submitted separately. 
DATED this [4 day o£jSfffCh, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: — - ^ 
STEPHEN L. HENROID , ji 'j 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE • °'-\•/ 
N \8862\6\ORDER JUD 
A>\b 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Donna L. Campbell, employed by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 
attorneys for defendant herein; served the attached Proposed ORDER AND JUDGMENT (Case 
Number 970901748, Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County) upon the parties 
listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Mark Dalton Dunn 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3575 South Market Street, #206 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
and caused the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on t h e 0 j _ dayjof March, 1998 
Donna L. Campbell 
Us 
Tab 7 
CAPATO v. GARFF, 9709C ^48 PI Condenselt TM HEARING, 3-2-98 
Case No. 970901748 PI 
HEARING, 3-2-98 
1 IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
2 SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
3 • * * 
4 CAROL CAPATO, 
5 Plaintiff, 
6 -vs-




11 BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 2nd day 
12 of March, 1998, at 9:30 o'clock a.m., this cause came 
13 on for hearing before the HONORABLE STEPHEN L. 
14 HENRIOD, District Court, without a jury in tBfc Salt 
15 Lake County Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah 
16 





For the Plaintiff: 






23 CAT by: CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, RPR 
24 
25 
MARK D. DUNN 
Attorney at Law 
ROBERT HENDERSOI 










1 MR. HENDERSON: Here it is, a 
2 cross-referral to the information you see on the 
3 window form, capital "Buyers," capital "Guide" where 
4 this vehicle is part of the contract. The 
5 information on the window form overrides any contract 
6 provisions in the contract of sale. I've received a 
7 copy of the FCC Used Car Buyer's Guide signed here by 
8 the Plaintiff. 
9 Now, Exhibits 2 and 3, Judge, is a front 
10 and back side of the Buyer's Guide Form. If I might 
11 hand the original of this up to the Court for a 
12 moment? 
13 This is the as-is, no warranty form. 
14 This is the one that Miss Capato said she didn't 
15 sign. 
16 We think two things, Judge: There is no 
17 genuine issue that Miss Capato not only got this form 
18 but signed it. 
19 THE COURT: Yeah, she's obviously signed 
20 it. 
21 MR. HENDERSON: We submit - as you know, 
22 we submitted these to handwriting experts who's been 
23 amazingly silent, no affidavit. And in his 
24 Memorandum, Mr. Dunn suggests that I'm not entitled 
25 to any kind of reliance on that. I don't believe 
Page 2 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: I think I've read 
3 everything. It appears that Ken Garff Enterprises 
4 wants me to rule that their advertising, when they 
5 say, "We stand behind every car we sell," doesn't 
6 mean anything. 
7 MR. HENDERSON: That is about it, Your 
8 Honor. 
9 Could I walk you through the documents, 
10 if I might? Do you have, Judge, my Memorandum in 
11 Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
12 there? I'd like to start at Tab 1. That's the Motor 
13 Vehicle Contract of Sale. And even the Plaintiff, 
14 Mrs. Capato, admits she signed this one. 
15 By the way, Judge, can I hand you up the 
16 original? 
17 THE COURT: Yeah. This one is kind of 
18 hard to read. 
19 MR. HENDERSON: I'll need this one back. 
20 THE COURT: That's fine. 
21 MR. HENDERSON: I would like to call the 
22 Court's attention to the right-hand column under the 
23 more bold print about a third of the way down: 
24 "Notice only to buyers of used vehicles." 
25 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
Page 4 
1 that to be the case. I didn't do a lot of legal 
2 research on this, but I did pull the old JIFU 3.13 on 
3 the effective failure to produce available stronger 
4 evidence. 
5 THE COURT: Plus I understand that the 
6 only sworn evidence that the Plaintiff is offering is 
7 her deposition. 
8 MR. HENDERSON: Correct, Your Honor. 
9 MR. DUNN: Correct. 
10 MR. HENDERSON: Now, but even if, even 
11 if, you were to be inclined to say that her denial of 
12 signing this form - which she's obviously signed if 
13 you compare the signature against the Contract of 
14 Sale that she admits she signed — we think we are 
15 entitled to summary judgment anyway for the reasons 
16 that I'm about to state. Back to Exhibit 1, the Sale 
17 Contract. If you'll note, Judge, down at the bottom 
18 on Page 1 just above where she signed, again, the 
19 second paragraph up, it starts out: 
20 "As is stated on the reverse 
21 side of this document, unless seller 
22 has given to purchaser an express 
23 warranty in writing, seller makes no 
24 warranty express or implied with 
25 respect to merchantability, fitness 
CARLTON WAY, 801-535-5464 Page 1 - Page 4 
4.\b 
CAPATO v. GARFF, 9709P'^48 PI Condenselt™
 ) HEARING, 3-2-98 
T ' Page 5 
1 for a particular purpose or otherwise 
2 concerning the vehicle.11 
3 Now, Judge, if you look at the back side 
4 of that form, I believe it is Paragraph No. 4 — 
5 unfortunately, I've given you my original. 
6 THE COURT: You are right. It is Number 
7 4: 
8 "No warranties expressed or 
9 implied will be deemed to have been 
10 been made by either seller or the 
11 manufacturer of the new motor 
12 vehicle..." 
13 MR. HENDERSON: The first paragraph of 
14 Paragraph 4 pertains to new vehicles, but the second 
15 paragraph pertains specifically to used vehicles. So 
16 we are here in a situation where we think that 
17 there's no genuine issue that we sold the vehicle as 
18 is. But beyond that, the Plaintiff is here with 
19 utterly no evidence of any warranty. And beyond 
20 that, the Plaintiff's, herself, own sworn testimony 
21 at her deposition is highly probative of the fact 
22 that she, herself, knew she had no warranty. And I 
23 start, Your Honor, at Page 49 where I asked her: 
24 "During the time that you were 
25 looking into making the acquisition of 
1 Page 6 
1 the f 86 Mercedes, did you make any 
2 inquiry to Tina Holbrooke (that was 
3 our salesperson) as to whether there 
4 would be any warranty that attached?" 
5 She says, "Yeah." 
6 And I said, "When was that?" 
1 7 And Mrs. Capato says: 
I 8 "I asked if I could have an 
9 extended warranty." 
10 I asked her: "Tell me when that 
11 was." 
12 She said: "The same day I was 
13 acquiring it. 
14 "On June "96? 
15 "Yes. 
16 "You asked Tina? 
17 "Yes. 
18 "For an extended warranty? 
19 "Yes." 
20 And then we continue on over on Page 51: 
21 "So you asked Tina if you could 
22 get an extended warranty. And what 
23 did Tina tell you? 
24 "She would look into it. 
[25 "Was this the end of the 
f ' Page 7] 
1 conversation with Tina on that subject 
2 or was there more?" 
3 The answer: "That was basically, 
4 yes, because I was waiting to see if I 
5 could get it." 
6 And then I asked her: "So the 
7 last you heard on your request for an 
8 extended warranty was, 'I will look 
9 intoit?,M 
10 Her answer: "Tm looking,' 
11 yes." 
12 Then I asked her: "Did you 
13 understand that the extended warranty 
14 was something that would have to be 
15 purchased?" 
16 Her answer was: "I didn't mind 
17 purchasing, you know, an extended 
18 warranty. I wanted one." 
19 And then I asked her: "You knew 
20 an extended warranty didn't come for 
21 free?" 
22 She said, "Actually, I didn't 
23 know a whole lot about it. I just 
24 knew it was a good idea. I wanted to 
25 get one. Yes, I knew it didn't come 
Page 8 
1 for free." 
2 "Any other discussions with 
3 Tina?" 
4 She says, "Not that I can 
5 recall." 
6 Then on Page 54 of her own deposition, 
7 she admits she knew the car was ten years old, had 
8 over a hundred thousand miles on it. 
9 Then on to Page 55, back to this subject 
10 about an extended warranty: 
11 "Was any price ever quoted to 
12 you about what the extended warranty 
13 that you wanted would cost? 
14 "No." 
15 And then I asked her: "When you 
16 went down there, you knew you had a 
17 certain amount that you could afford 
18 to spend? 
19 "Yes. 
20 "Was it your intent to acquire a 
21 used car? 
22 "Yes. 
23 "What was the amount you had to 
24 spend? 
25 "I had $5,000. 
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1 "Did you find anything for 
2 $5,000? 
3 "No." 
4 Then, Your Honor, and this is 
5 significant, Page 56: 
6 "At any time after the 1st of 
7 June of '96 up until the 3rd of July, 
8 '96" -
J 9 That's when the air bag unfortunately 
10 deployed resulting in some, what we consider to be, 
11 minor injuries to the Plaintiff, without getting any 
12 disagreement here about the nature and extent of 
13 those injuries. 
14 "-- up until the 3rd of July, 
15 did you make any additional efforts 
16 torward obtaining the extended 
17 warranty? 
18 "Yes." 
19 I asked her to tell me what. 
20 "I called there to ask for Tina, 
21 and they would say she was out or with 
22 someone and I had to leave a message." 
23 Then I go on: "Did you have any 
24 conversations with Tina?" 
25 Down at the bottom she says: 
Page 101 
1 ''No, I never got to find out." 
2 Basically, this is the j 
3 Plaintiff: "I never got to find out \ 
4 about the extended warranty." 
5 At the top of Page 57: "Did you 
6 speak to anyone else at Ken Garff i 
7 during that time about the subject of 
8 your desire to acquire an extended 
9 warranty?" 
10 Her answer was: "When I asked 
11 her or talking to her, this other man 
12 who was writing up the papers, the 
13 finance guy, was there. I didn't 
14 really talk to him about it." 
15 And then I asked her a few more questions 
16 in the middle of Page 57: 
17 "Did you talk to anybody? 
18 "Answer: No." 
19 So she knew she needed or wanted an 
20 extended warranty, and she knew that she didn't have 
21 one and didn't pay for one. So, based on the 
22 Contract of Sale, based on her not having any 
23 warranty, based on her not knowing she didn't have 
24 any warranty, we think we are entitled to summary 
uS judgment. 
Page 11 1 
1 Now, the interesting thing here: She 
2 went out and got her own inspection, Motor Vehicle 
3 Safety Inspection, on the car. It passed. And this 
4 woman admitted in her deposition that she has worked 
5 for at least five years in sales, documenting sales 
6 transactions and at one time even worked for a car 
7 dealership in sales. I believe it was Wagstaff. 
8 This is not a woman who is unsophisticated in 
9 documenting contracts of sale. 
10 We understand that she had some bad luck 
11 with this car, and she's disgruntled. We think, Your 
12 Honor, however, she purchased this motor vehicle as 
13 is, nothing promised, nothing owed and that we should 
14 be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
15 THE COURT: It is your position that the 
16 signed disclaimers obviate all of the advertising? 
17 MR. HENDERSON: That is our position. 
18 And, in fact, there is an integration clause in the 
19 Contract of Sale. 
20 THE COURT: I know. It is Still 
21 troubling to me. I mean, those ads — I know what 
22 those ads say. I think everybody who watches 
23 television in this community knows what those ads 
24 say, and they are very specific. 
25 MR. HENDERSON: "We back up every car we 
Page 12 
1 sell"? 
2 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
3 MR. HENDERSON: Your Honor, the 
4 interesting thing about that, and I can quote you 
5 chapter and verse out of the depositions: This motor 
6 vehicle did not qualify for the 30 day, 3,000 mile 
7 warranty for two reasons: It was too old. This was 
8 a ten-year-old vehicle. 
9 THE COURT: A ten-year-old Mercedes is 
10 not nearly as old as a three-year-old Chevrolet in 
11 real terms. It may not qualify for Ken Garff's 
12 warranty as a result of that, but it is not like she 
13 was buying a junker for $10,000. 
14 MR. HENDERSON: Well, the vehicle did 
15 have in excess of 125,000 miles on it. 
16 THE COURT: If I bought that car, I would 
17 expect it to go 300,000 miles because it is a 
18 Mercedes Benz. 
19 MR. HENDERSON: Well, Your Honor, I would 
20 only say this to you, and I understand your 
21 feelings -
22 THE COURT: I mean, it sounds to me like 
23 it's false advertising. 
24 MR. HENDERSON: In what regard? 
25 THE COURT: Saying, "We back up every car 
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1 we sell," and then slapping an as-is, no warranties 
2 sign on the cars on the lot. There is a major 
3 contradiction there. 
4 MR. HENDERSON: Well, let me maybe put it 
5 to you in these terms: I have got a couple of kids, 
6 I have got four cars. This is hard for me to do. I 
7 have a 16-year-old motor vehicle. I am just putting 
8 this in terms of ~ that maybe you can relate to. 
9 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
10 MR. HENDERSON: Maybe you have a second 
11 car or a third car for your family. I would suggest 
12 to you that Miss Capato, who only had $5,000 to 
13 spend, or other people that are in need of purchasing 
14 a used car, couldn't get into that vehicle for the 
15 price she got into it if it isn't an as-is sale. 
16 Now, this is the way the world works. 
17 THE COURT: You know, that is not the 
18 issue. The issue is whether or not anybody explained 
19 that to her. 
20 MR. HENDERSON: Beyond as is? 
21 THE COURT: No. What youfvejust started 
22 explaining to me. I mean, if somebody explained that 
23 to her and she acknowledged understanding it, I'd 
24 probably feel a little differently about her 
25 situation; although Ken Garffs advertising still 
Page 14 
1 Would trouble me. 
2 I'm also troubled by the fact that she 
3 signed all these documents and then in her deposition 
4 she says she never saw them. But I have a problem 
J 5 with the advertising and with this corporation 
6 wanting to ignore the fact that they lure the public 
7 onto their premises with advertising that would imply 
8 that their cars are guaranteed. I mean, it is not 
9 going to bother you or me or Mr. Dunn if we go and 
10 buy a car, but if one of those kids we are talking j 
11 about, mine or yours or Mr. Dunn's, goes and buys 
12 that same car, they very well could believe, based on 
13 thousands of television advertisements, that they are 
14 buying a car that has something behind it at Ken 
15 Garff. The man's dead now, but his face still 
16 carries a lot of credibility on that TV. 
17 Do you have case law that says that the 
18 written disclaimers supersede the advertising? 
19 MR. HENDERSON: It says it right in the 
20 contract. 
21 THE COURT: That's not what I asked. Do 
22 you have any cases? 
23 MR. HENDERSON: rm sure I can come up 
24 with some, Judge. 
|25 THE COURT: Let me hear from Mr. Dunn. 
[ Page 15 1 
1 MR. HENDERSON: Okay. 
2 THE COURT: And I'm going to order that 
3 her deposition be published and ask that one of you 
4 leave me a complete copy. 
5 MR. DUNN: I didn't bring you one. lean 
6 provide you with one. 
! 7 Thank you, Your Honor. I believe that 
8 the Court is aware of our position. Perhaps a couple 
9 of things that I would just like to add: Not only 
10 are those advertisements stating that "We back up 
11 every car we sell," but there's an additional what we 
12 feel to be an express warranty in that "We, Ken 
13 Garff, do an inspection of these cars," and that that 
14 is really, in part, what they are backing up. 
15 What we'd like to be able to do is see 
16 what that inspection is. We believe that the 
17 inspection may well have — if it were to have 
18 occurred, may well have caught this problem with this 
19 flex seal that should have been at least inspected if 
20 not replaced every 30,000 miles and could have 
21 prevented this accident. And that's where our point 
22 to the motion to compel goes in that we'd like to see 
23 the advertising which says they will do the 
24 inspection and what that inspection list includes. 
25 Because if that inspection list includes such a flex 
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1 seal, this action may not have occurred. 
2 And also on a point other than the 
3 contract is the negligence issue. We believe that 
4 they have affirmatively assumed the duty that, "We 
5 will inspect every car we sell pursuant to this 
6 checklist." They have undertaken that duty. They 
7 admittedly did not inspect this car. That brings us 
8 to the fact issue. The fact issue is: Was it 
9 explained to my client that this was a consignment 
10 car excluded from all the warranties, excluded from 
11 all of the advertisements, excluded from the 
12 inspections, or as my client recalls she was 
13 represented that this is a perfect car, it has been 
14 in the Garff Family, it has been well taken care of, 
15 well-maintained and all of these warranties would 
16 apply. So, therefore, they've taken the assumption 
17 of a duty; admittedly, did not fulfill that duty and 
18 personal injuries have occurred. 
19 THE COURT: Is it a fact that we agree 
20 upon that, that this was not inspected, 
21 Mr. Henderson? 
22 MR. HENDERSON: No, we don't agree to 
23 that. In fact -
24 MR. DUNN: I thought we had. 
25 MR. HENDERSON: - we don't agree to most 
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1 of what Your Honor just put to me. What I have done 
2 here is to try to create a situation where we were 
3 entitled to summary judgment-
4 THE COURT: Sure. 
5 MR. HENDERSON: - on undisputed facts, 
6 because, in fact, Miss Holbrooke has testified under 
7 oath that she did explain all of this stuff to the 
8 Plaintiff. 
9 MR. DUNN: But that was clearly 
10 contested. What went on in this deal is clearly 
11 contested by the parties. Miss Holbrooke's testimony 
12 is — will be, if not specifically point by point 
13 already rebutted in the deposition, clearly is not my 
14 client's recollection of what occurred. 
15 THE COURT: okay. But that's - we are 
16 not there yet. 
17 MR. DUNN: Understood. I believe that's 
18 the entirety of my argument. But I would put that in 
19 addition to what the Court has already raised. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to take it 
21 under advisement. Leave me a copy of the depo. 
22 MR. HENDERSON: Could we send that back 
23 over to you, Judge? 
24 THE COURT: Sure, that will be fine. 
25 (Hearing adjourned.) 
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